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MATT NELSON AND DIAN A.H.
SHAH: THE POLITICS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
“REASONABLENESS”
IN MALAYSIA
In 1997, a Muslim-born woman (Lina Joy) applied to the
Malaysian National Registration Department (NRD) to have
her name changed – she stated in her application that she
had converted to Christianity to marry a Christian man. The
NRD rejected her application six months later (without
stating any reasons). But, in 1999 she submitted a second
application and included a statutory declaration that she
had converted to Christianity. Her application was
approved, but owing to new regulations her revised identity
card nevertheless stated that her religion was ‘Islam’. Joy
then submitted a third application to remove the word
‘Islam’ from her identity card, but this was not accepted as
she failed to produce a syariah court order certifying that
she had renounced Islam.
The bureaucratic processes that Lina Joy faced to secure
o!icial state recognition of her conversion shows that, in
practice, the exercise of religious freedom is o"en extremely
di!icult to separate from state-enforced administrative
procedures. In other words, despite constitutional
protections for a right to ‘profess and practice’ one’s
religion, in practice this right is routinely tied to procedures
through which the state might come to recognize, and
formalize, the right. Ensuring a person’s correct religious
identification (for the purpose of state records) is all the
more pertinent in Malaysia as Muslims and non-Muslims are
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governed by di!erent laws with regard to personal and
family matters. In addition, Muslims are subject to laws
regulating ‘syariah criminal o!ences’. The question is: at
what point do administrative ‘regulations’ render one’s
‘right’ to religious freedom meaningless? Which
bureaucratic procedures are ‘reasonable’ for the purpose of
operationalizing this basic right?
In the particular circumstances surrounding Lina Joy’s case,
the state’s bureaucratic demands required Joy to complete
a set of procedures that did not yet exist in the jurisdiction
where her case arose (i.e. the Federal Territory of Kuala
Lumpur). Whereas in some Malaysian states procedures for
the renunciation of Islam are spelled out in specific syariah
enactments passed by state legislatures, there was (and still
is) no such procedure in Kuala Lumpur.
Typically, the case of Lina Joy has been read as a clash
between Malaysia’s state-level syariah courts and a
fundamental right to religious freedom. Without detracting
from the weight and significance of such analyses, we put
forward an alternative approach, focusing on administrative
law, to understand why Lina Joy’s case turned out as it did
while, at the same time, illuminating the implications of her
case for religious freedom in Malaysia.
When Joy appeared before Malaysia’s highest court, the
court was asked to determine whether, in bridging the gap
between Joy’s constitutionally protected right to religious
‘self-identification’ and the state’s ‘recognition’ of that
identification, asking her to complete a set of as-yet-non-
existent bureaucratic procedures should be considered
administratively ‘reasonable’. In the end, the Federal Court,
by a 2:1 majority, concluded that the NRD’s actions were
‘reasonable’ for three principal reasons.
First, the Court noted that the NRD’s insistence on
authoritative evidence from a syariah court confirming that
Joy was no longer a Muslim (instead of Joy’s statutory
declaration that she had renounced Islam) was ‘reasonable’
because, in the Court’s view, renouncing Islam implicated
Islamic law, so it was perfectly reasonable for the state to
require formal confirmation from Islamic authorities who
were thought to possess the expertise required to
adjudicate such matters.
Second, the court noted that, even though the
Administration of Islamic Law (Federal Territories) Act
(1993) did not provide any procedures governing Muslim
apostasy, the majority in a previous case known as Soon
Singh had declared that, in cases of Muslim apostasy, the
jurisdiction of the syariah courts could be implied even in
the absence of any clear statutory prescription.[1]
Third, the NRD’s 1990 Regulations did not o!er any clear
guidance as to what must be provided to correct erroneous
particulars on an ID card; however, the Court held that it
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was within the discretion of each NRD o!icer to determine
which documentary evidence was required to confirm the
accuracy of any applicant’s details and that, in cases of
Muslim apostasy, it was ‘reasonable’ in light of prevailing
jurisprudence to expect some type of certification from
Malaysia’s state-level syariah courts.[2]
The Lina Joy saga reminds us that religious freedom is
never merely a ‘negative’ right constraining the power of the
state. The enforceability of this right almost invariably
depends on ‘positive’ forms of bureaucratic intervention
and state-based ‘recognition’. In this respect, the Court was
careful to avoid stating that Lina Joy had no right to change
her religion; instead, it merely emphasized that the exercise
of one’s right to religious freedom was subject to the
relevant regulations.
Jurisprudential analysis aside, it is worth understanding the
Lina Joy case within its larger historical and political
context. Here, we highlight two main issues.
The first issue concerns the federalized system of
administering Islam in Malaysia and the position of state-
level sultans vis-à-vis the definition and enforcement of
Islamic laws and Malay customs. Malaysia’s pre-
independence constitutional settlement led to the
establishment of Islam as the religion of the Malaysian
Federation, but the Malay rulers were assured that this
establishment would not encroach on their centuries-old
position as the heads of Islam in their respective states.
Matters concerning Islamic law and Malay customs thus fall
under the jurisdiction of each state with certain limitations.
In particular, List II Schedule 9 of the Malaysian constitution
specifies which aspects of Islamic law (namely personal and
family laws and ‘o!ences against the precepts of Islam’) fall
within the legislative competence of each state legislature.
Furthermore, each state-level sultan has the authority to
decide – usually in consultation with state religious councils
and state religious bureaucracies – whether or not to accept
specific ‘Islamic’ laws governing the Muslims residing in that
state. From time to time, such laws emerge from the work of
state-level legislatures, fatwas issued by state-level mu"is,
or the advice of a federal Islamic A!airs department known
as JAKIM. But, in Malaysia’s Federal Territories, where the
case of Lina Joy emerged, ‘Islamic’ laws must be
promulgated by the federal parliament and, then, endorsed
by Malaysia’s king (a position that rotates, every five years,
amongst Malaysia’s state-level sultans). Needless to say this
arrangement produces di!erent Islamic laws in di!erent
parts of Malaysia, with Malaysia’s Federal Territories
functioning like any other Malaysian state.
Di!erent states have di!erent mechanisms for dealing with
Muslim apostasy, ranging from more ‘punitive’ to more
‘permissive’ measures. In fact one of the most important
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political questions to emerge from the case of Lina Joy was
this: which procedural standard, governing Muslim
apostasy, should Malaysia’s Federal Territories adopt? So
far, the federal government has not chosen to adopt any
procedure at all; this is the statutory gap that produced
such a di!icult situation for Lina Joy. And, yet, crucially, the
Federal Court refrained from any attempt to fill this gap by
legislating from the bench. Instead, the Court maintained
that the administrative procedures required to ‘recognize’
and ‘formalize’ Lina Joy’s religious identity could only be
defined by Malaysia’s federal parliament.
The second contextual issue involves the broader political
dynamics within which Malaysia’s federal parliament is
situated. For decades, Malaysia’s federal government has
been controlled by a centre-right coalition known as the
Barisan Nasional led by the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO). This coalition o"en seeks to shore up
its religious legitimacy by ‘out-Islamizing’ its leading
political opponents—above all, an ‘Islamist’ party known as
the Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS). PAS controls the northern
state of Kelantan, where the state legislature has sought to
ensure that Muslim apostasy is subject to capital
punishment. This punishment, however, has been thwarted
by federal restrictions within which the punitive reach of
any state-level syariah court is restricted: fines up to
MYR5000, imprisonment up to three years, and six strokes of
the cane. Other states, like Negeri Sembilan, adopt a very
di!erent approach to Muslim apostasy. In Negeri Sembilan,
would-be apostates are sent for three months of
‘rehabilitative counseling’ (followed by a one-year cooling-
o! period) before their conversion can be—at least
ostensibly—certified by the state’s syariah courts.
The last time state-level apostasy laws were enacted was
2003, both in then PAS-controlled Terengganu and in BN-
controlled Negeri Sembilan.[3] There were, however, other
e!orts to introduce apostasy regulations, including earlier
e!orts by the federal government and the state of Perlis in
2000.[4] In these two cases, however, the relevant bills fell
through; the federal government’s proposal (which
resembled the relatively ‘permissive’ procedures in Negeri
Sembilan) never reached the floor of parliament for debate,
and in BN-controlled Perlis, a similar bill (specifying one
year of rehabilitative detention) was passed only to be
withdrawn shortly therea"er on orders from the federal
government. [5] A deeper understanding of the federal
government’s approach to apostasy legislation—precisely
the sort of legislation needed to fill the statutory and
administrative lacuna faced by Lina Joy—requires some
appreciation for the larger political and electoral contexts
within which it is situated. So far the federal government
has hesitated to pursue covering legislation; some felt that,
in a context framed by ongoing e!orts to ‘out-Islamize’ PAS,
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this hesitation was framed by concerns that its earlier
proposals (resembling those in Negeri Sembilan) would be
seen, politically, as ‘too so"’.
To conclude, we emphasize the underlying political issues
that framed the legal questions surrounding Joy’s religious
freedom as an explicitly administrative matter. Malaysia’s
federal courts have consistently refused to legislate from the
bench. In fact they have repeatedly dismissed the view that
a commitment to institutional centralisation is necessary to
ensure a legal defence of fundamental rights. Reinforcing
common-law norms of judicial restraint, in other words, the
Federal Court adopted a posture of deference vis-à-vis the
government’s legislative and administrative powers.
Turning to the specific actions of the NRD, however, the
Court sought to determine whether, within the context of
Malaysia, its administrative actions were so perverse that no
‘reasonable’ authority in Malaysia could ever be expected to
perform them. This is, of course, the famous Wednesbury
‘reasonableness test’ underpinning so much of British
administrative law. In fact this was the test that allowed the
Malaysian Federal Court to describe, as ‘reasonable’, the
actions of a bureaucrat who refused to provide state
recognition for Lina Joy’s self-identification (as an ‘ex-
Muslim’) without additional evidence from a Malaysian
shari‘ah court.
Clearly, when faced with this intersection between
fundamental rights and administrative law, one could be
forgiven for asking how a fundamental right to religious
freedom might serve as a check on state power if, in
practice, the operationalization of that right is tied to
politically contextualized decisions regarding the
‘reasonableness’ of discretionary administrative action. This
is, we argue, an issue that deserves far more attention in the
literature.
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